Abstract. We study the weakness of key schedules from an observation: many existing attacks use the fact that the key schedules poorly distribute key bits in the diffusion path of round function. This reminds us of the importance of the diffusion's relation between key schedule and round function. We present new cryptanalysis results by exploring such diffusion relation and propose a new criterion for necessary key schedule diffusion. We discuss potential attacks and summarize the causes for key schedules without satisfying this criterion. One major cause is that overlapping between the diffusion of key schedule and round function leads to information leakage of key bits. Finally, a measure to estimate our criterion for recursive key schedules is presented. Today designing key schedule still lacks practical and necessary principles. For a practical key schedule with limited diffusion, our work adds more insight to its requirements and helps to maximize the security level.
Introduction
There is not a clear consensus on sufficient and necessary condition that a key schedule must satisfy. Previous designers paid more attention to the cipher algorithms. Key schedules have not achieved deserving attention and scrutiny as the algorithms. Many existing designing rules for key schedule are far away from practical guidance. Some of them are too strong to be used in practice; some of them are too weak to be secure enough; some of them only focus on a specific kind of attack and are one-legged; some of them are empirical and lack of sound reasons why they should be. However, more and more attacks using key schedule weaknesses indicate that the research on key schedule design principles is pressing. A poor key schedule can break a perfectly good cipher [34, 10, 35, 6] .
Today we only know some basic principles. e.g. a key schedule should avoid (semi-)weak keys, equivalent keys, and complementation property [11] . Asymmetry such as round constants is also needed to prevent symmetry in the cipher leading to slide attacks, e.g. AES, Serpent. Totally independent and random subkeys are thought to be secure, but this requires a large number of key bits. Practical key schedule generates paseudorandom subkeys at most. One type of "strong" key schedule is constructed using one-way function, or encryption cipher to achieve weakly one-way. These key schedules are not adopted by nearly all widely used block ciphers due to their low efficiency lacking obvious necessity. Early key schedules are very simple, including following kinds: simple permutation of master key, e.g. DES, IDEA; direct or recursive linear transformation from master key. As the development of cryptanalysis technique, the designer began to add non-linear operations, such as S-boxes, into key schedules for avoiding related-key (differential) type attacks. Most of non-linear key schedules are falling into three types. First type is similar to the SPN structure of block cipher, such as AES. A typical case of second type is Serpent, which goes through a number of S-boxes after linear transformation. The third type usually uses cipher primitives to generate prekeys-this ensures a certain degree of confusion and diffusion, then transform prekeys into subkeys linearly. These key schedules are invertible to eliminate equivalent keys, which may appear in a one-way situation [17] . Our Contribution. In this paper, we observe that most of the attacks exploiting key schedule weakness are based on the fact that the key bits are insufficiently distributed in the diffusion of round function, and give examples to illustrate this fact. From this observation, we point out that the relation between the diffusion of cipher function and the diffusion of key schedule will affect the degree of encryption process's dependency on key bits. We discuss this relation in terms of the definitions of calculation dependency path and actual key information. A criterion for key schedule is proposed which is ignored by most designers now. Potential attacks when our criterion is not satisfied are discussed and causes are summarized. Moreover, by examining our criterion on other ciphers, new cryptanalysis results are presented, including: meet-in-the-middle attacks on 40-round SHACAL-2 and 25-round XTEA; improving a meet-in-the-middle attack on Serpent with lower time complexity and on AES with lower memory complexity; minor improvements for Safer++ and MISTY1. Finally, we present a way to measure our criterion for recursive key schedules. Since most practical key schedules need high efficiency, their linear diffusion are limited and cannot achieve "completeness" as in most round functions. How to maximize the security level in this situation is meaningful. Our criterion concentrates on the linear layer of key schedules, and it is a necessary requirement whatever the non-linear components are.
Previous Work and Our Motivation
This section introduces previous design rules for key schedules. We highlight the work relating with linear transformation, and discuss what they lack of.
In [15] , the author summarized the following purpose: "to present each key bit to a message input, and to an autoclave input, of each S-box as quickly as possible". By generating different permutations for DES key schedule, the author tested ciphertext dependence on key bits [31] , and developed new principles: each key bit is used as input to each S-box in turn; no bit is used as autoclave inputs or excluded on successive rounds. From these empirical principles we can only derive that key bits should be uniformly used. More detailed effects caused by key schedules with different permutations and potential attacks caused by key schedules without satisfying above principles are not mentioned.
In [2] , the author pointed out that all subkeys should be equally good, and defined a so-called "strong key schedule" with this property: it is "hard" to find any remaining key bits from any known key bits. The author then proposed a simple "strong key schedule" using encryption functions.
In [13] , the author discovered that several practical attacks utilize the linear relation between subkey bits in different rounds, which avoids considerable amount of work. So he suggested this relation be practically intractable, and proposed two necessary properties: equal effect for all input key bits and weakly one-way. For these properties the author constructed a key schedule with nfolding algorithm and DES(3 single DES and 1 triple-DES), which slows down key setup obviously.
In [3] the author recommended maximizing avalanche in the subkeys. If possible every key bit should affect nearly every round in different ways. More specific principles are given in [4] , including: hard to invert; no equivalent keys and collision-freedom-standard hash function properties; no dead spots; equally powerful effect of every key bit on the subkeys.
In [14] , the author indicated that knowledge of one subkey provides no leakage of information about any other subkeys. Each subkey is generated by inputting all master key bits to a one-way function, ensuring the avalanche effect and the entropy.
In [11] , the author adopted a invertible and recursive structure to design AES key schedule. He claimed that this structure must possess low implementation cost, sufficient diffusion and asymmetry.
In [12] , the author stressed on one-wayness and minimal mutual information between all subkey bits and master key bits(using master key bits directly in subkeys leads to the worst case), which can be obtained by one-wayness. He measured one-wayness with Shannon's bit confusion and bit diffusion with statistical tests.
Above work can be summarized into two problems: no bit leakage and maximizing avalanche. First, key schedules should have no bit leakage in the level of "round", or of the whole key schedule. The former means they only consider leakage between different rounds of subkeys, or between some rounds of subkeys and master keys. When an recursive key schedule is invertible or when subkeys are direct transformation from master key, above leakage cannot be avoided. The latter means that no subkey bits can be derived easily whatever key knowledge is obtained. Many recent attacks show that the "round" consideration is not enough for security, while considering the whole key schedule is too strong with no attack supporting its necessity. So what kinds of leakage should a key schedule avoid? Moreover, the obscure understanding for the pattern of leakage leads to a recommendation of using one-way function, which has unpractical efficiency and existence of equivalent keys. Even the irreversibility of one-way function eliminates the leakage, it makes detecting equivalent keys difficult. For example, [12] applied AES round function to its key schedule for one-wayness, and this key schedule is proved to exist 2 271 equivalent key pairs [17] . Second, maximizing avalanche effect reminds us of the importance of the diffusion in a key schedule. The AES designer claimed that his key schedule can achieve sufficient diffusion by taking a recursive structure. However, this key schedule has caused many attacks due to its slow diffusion, which is not the original intention of the designer. The definition of "sufficient" or "slow" for diffusion is unclear and just intuitive. So what requirements should the diffusion of key schedules satisfy? We consider above two problems together by relating the key schedule's diffusion with the cipher function's diffusion to propose a more detailed leakage pattern. Through our specific requirements, a key schedule can be designed more targeted.
Our Definitions
First, we improve a 6-round meet-in-the-middle attack [5] on Serpent [32] for explaining our definitions. The plaintext is B 0 and the ciphertext is B 6 . B i is the input of round i, X i is the input of S-box layer in round i, and Y i is the input of linear layer in round i. The bit to meet is X 3 3,7 (at 3'th row, 7'th column of X 3 ). Fig. 1 shows the computation flow from the plaintext. The grey boxes represent the internal bits needed to compute in each round, and it is easy to know which key bits are involved in this computation.
The amount of the involved key is 237 bits by Fig. 1 . However, according to the linear transformation in the key schedule, the grey 8 bits in K 2 can derive from the gray bits in K 0 and K 1 . So actually the information of involved key is 229 bits, with a possible time complexity reduction. We check the decryption flow, and exchange the order of linear transform L in round i-1 and key XOR operation in round i. Instead of guessing K 4 , and K 5 , we guess K 4 and K 5 ,
We need to guess 4 bits in K 4 , 48 bits in K 5 and 124 bits in K 6 . The total is 176 bits. So the total complexity depends on the computation from plaintext. The time complexity of original attack is 2 247 , while our time complexity is 2 233 with 2 5 data complexity. The improvement of our attack is mainly based on two facts. First is the existence of equivalent key steming from the characteristics of key-alternating structure, and this has been used in many other attacks such as on AES and ARIA. We stress on the second fact that the combined action of the key schedule's diffusion and the round function's diffusion makes the actual involved key bits less than their expected number. The effect of round function diffusion on the key schedule is not neglectable. One measure for diffusion is the completeness property, which deals with the dependency of each output bit on the input bits. So for the "incomplete" diffusion, we focus on the dependency of output bits on input bits and give the following definitions. Definition 1. Calculation Dependency Path: X is a m-bit intermediate value. According to the cipher round function, there is a calculation path for X 0 : Note that the direction is considered as "backward", opposite to the encryption direction. Similarly, a "forward" calculation dependency path corresponding to decryption process is opposite to the decryption direction.
f i is a sub-function depending on the cipher structure, where i = 1, ..., s. X i is the set of input bits for f i and X i−1 is the set of output bits, i.e. the calculation of X i−1 is dependent on X i and
Definition 2. Key Dependency Path: The subkey bits involved in a calculation dependency path are denoted as a key dependency path. That is, K 1 , K 2 , ...., K s .
Definition 3. Actual Key Information(AKI):
According to a key schedule, the minimal amount of key bits which can easily derive all subkey bits in a key dependency path is called actual key information.
The term "easily" depends on specific attack scenarios. We start the analysis from an output and trace its inputs successively, so the direction of path in Fig. 2 is considered as "backward", opposite to the encryption direction. Similarly, a "forward" calculation dependency path corresponding to decryption process is opposite to the decryption direction. The output can be one bit, or any size no larger than block size, depending on specific attack scenarios. A typical calculation dependency path is a one-round cipher involving one-round subkey. Obviously the diffusion layer mainly determines the related intermediate values in a path, since the non-linear module only has a limited range of diffusion(e.g. 4, 8, or 16-bit). Note that both calculation dependency path and its key dependency path depend on the diffusion of round function, and AKI is determined by the diffusion of key schedule. Ciphers with different structures have different forms of sub-functions. Take SPN structure as an example, the sub-function f i can be easily known from the entries of linear transformation matrix corresponding to X i−1 . Look at Fig. 1 , the grey boxes in the left show a calculation dependency path, and in the right show a key dependency path. X 0 is X 3 3,7 , and X s is B 0 . The AKI is 229 bits of the linear map of master key.
In a combination of two or more paths, the definition of AKI still holds.
Existing Attacks Using Weakness of Key Schedules
One serious weakness of key schedules used by current attacks is the existence of calculation dependency paths missing some bits of master key('s map). The following examples illustrate how this insufficient AKI plays an important role in an attack
). The key dependency path are:
, with 112-bit AKI(the 50-33 bits of the master key). Forward: , with 103-bit AKI(the 125-99 bits of the master key). Above AKI are both less than master key size(128-bit), which make a meet-in-the-middle attack possible. The leaked information between these two key dependency paths further reduces memory complexity [6] .
Moreover, above 6-round attack is extended into 7.5-round with splice-andcut technique, using another path [6] 
The combined AKI of this path(0-95 bits of the master key) and above forward path is only 103 bits, so the top and bottom rounds can be connected to target more rounds. Above backward path is modified as
), without changing its corresponding AKI.
Finally, [6] proposed the distributive technique for speeding up exhaustive search, which save the searching complexity for the missing key bits in a calculation dependency path. The path
) misses 16-24 bits of the master key, so the attacker can perform operations in this path without guessing these 9 bits, and then perform the rest operations for all of the key guesses. This technique still needs to go over all the possible keys, but performs less than a full encryption for each key.
KASUMI
KASUMI [27] is a 64-bit, 8-round block cipher with 128-bit keys. The plaintext P = L 0 ||R 0 . Let L i and B i be the input and output of i + 1 round function respectively. X[i 1 ,...,i 2 ] denotes the (i 2 -i 1 + 1)-bit data from i 1 'th bit to i 2 'th bit of X. Each round key is made up of KL i , KO i and KI i . Here,
In [7] , the author proposed a meet-in-the-middle attack using initial structure and partial matching. The construction of the initial structure is based on a forward calculation dependency path:
In addition, when L 0 is 0x0000f f f f , the output of FL has nothing to do with KL 1 . So the involved subkeys are:
, KO 2,3 containing 7 16-bit words of master key except k 3 . Similarly, choose L 2 as 0x0000f f f f , the output of FL has nothing to do with KL 3 , so the backward path
These two paths bring about a initial structure separating k 3 in the process of searching the total key.
Moreover, using the distributive technique in [6] also can get a factor of almost 2 speedups for exhaustive search on KASUMI. Due to the absence of k 4 and k 8 in the top and bottom rounds of paths, the part of encryption performed until the full key guess is thus slightly more than 4 rounds.
MISTY1
8-round MISTY1 [28] has a more complicate key schedule than KASUMI while other components and structure are similar. However, although this key schedule adds non-linear S-boxes, its diffusion still exists flaws. In [8] the author extended an integral attack to 6-round MISTY1 by applying a weakness of the key schedule. We show this weakness also comes from a calculation dependency path with insufficient AKI. This example illustrates more clearly about the concept of sub-function in Definition 1 due to the structure of MISTY1. F O i denotes FO function in round i, and it includes F I i,1 , F I i,2 , F I i,3 , and two key XOR operations. IL i ||IR i is the 32-bit input of F O i . Each FI is keyed by AKO i,j and AKI i,j , where j = 1, 2, 3. [8] begins from the input of F I 4,2 .
Camellia
In [18] , the author gave a few observations on Camellia's key schedule [29] , which can also be summarized as key information leakage in the calculation dependency paths. Take Camellia-128 as an example, the AKI of the combination of (K 8 , K 9,2 ) and (K 16,2 , K 17 ) is only 82 bits(K i is the subkey of round function F in round i, K i,j is the j'th byte of K i ), which makes a 4 rounds extension on a 6-round impossible differentials feasible. The same situation also occurs in Camellia-192 and Camellia-256.
New Attacks Using Weakness of Key Schedules
By checking calculation dependency paths, we find new meet-in-the-middle attacks for 40-round SHACAL-2 and 25-round XTEA. In addition to Serpent mentioned in Section 3, we also improve previous attacks on AES and Safer++.
From now on, X[i 1 ] denotes the i 1 'th bit of X, and X[i 1 ,...,i 2 ] denotes the (i 2 -i 1 + 1)-bit data from i 1 'th bit to i 2 'th bit of X.
SHACAL-2
SHACAL-2 [21] is composed of 64 rounds using a variable key length up to 512 bits. A 256-bit plaintext is divided into eight 32-bit words A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H. P i is the input of round i, and P i+1 is the output of round i.
The best single-key attacks for SHACAL-2 are differential-linear attack on 32-round [19] and differentialnonlinear attack on 33-round [20] . Our attack is for 0-39 rounds with 512-bit keys. The plaintext is P 0 , and the ciphertext is P 40 . We find a forward and a backward calculation dependency paths with insufficient AKI both starting from H 20 [0]. See Table. 1 and Table. 2. 
The AKI of the backward path is 507 bits. There are totally 529 bits in the forward path which should have cover all the 512 bits master key. However, the leakage reduce the AKI to only 508 bits. SHACAL-2 was recommended to be one of the NESSIE selections, while SHACAL-1 was not selected due to some concerns of its key schedule. However, our analysis exposes that the key schedule of SHACAL-2 also has flaws. 
XTEA
XTEA [30] has 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size, which is extended from TEA [36] . The best 25-round result is a three-subset meet-in-the-middle with 9 known plaintexts and 2 120.4 XTEA computations [37] . Other recent results include [9, 22] . Our 25-round attack has similar complexity with [37] but is much simpler. The attacks in [9, 37] and ours all make use of calculation dependency paths without enough AKI.
L i ||R i and L i+1 ||R i+1 is the input and output of round i. Both XTEA and SHACAL-2 have the following common attributes leading to calculation dependency paths that can be used for attacking: the size of one round subkey is much less than the master key size, and the diffusion of cipher round function is slow for distributing key bits. If the key schedule's diffusion overlaps the diffusion of cipher round function to some extent, the actual number of distributed key bits further decreases. Above two attacks are mainly based on observations of key schedules, without other complicated cryptanalysis techniques. The lesson learned is that in a calculation path of cipher function, the key schedule should involve key bits outside this path as quickly as possible. Moreover, if there are any kinds of available relations between existing paths, the block cipher will be more unsafe.
AES
AES has 128-bit block size and supports three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits. It is byte-oriented, and the state is organized as a 4 × 4 table with one-byte entries. K (r) and C (r) denote the subkey and the ciphertext of r'th round.K (r) = M ixColumns −1 (K (r) ). X i,j denotes the byte of X at row i, column j.
Two calculation dependency paths both starting from C
1,1 are used. The forward is: 8) , with key dependency path denoted as A:K
1,1 ,K
2,4 ,K
3,3 ,Ĉ
4,2 , K (8) . The backward is:
4,4 )(M is the value after MixColumn), with key dependency path denoted as B:
1,1 . Another key path denoted as C is:
In [23] , the author described a meet-in-the-middle attack on 8-round AES-256 with two parts. First is precomputing all possible mappings of C (1) 1,1 → C (5) 1,1 . Then search key bytes in A and C to choose and encrypt a suitable plaintext set, and do a partial decryption on the ciphertext set.
Algorithm 5.2:
A meet-in-the-middle attack for 8-round AES-256(P ) for each guess of K
3,3 ,K
4,4 ,K
Store the 2 176 256 bytes sequence in a hash table for each guess of key bytes in path C for each guess of K
1,3 , andK
Deduce column 2, 3, 4 of K We improve the original attack by observing that the AKI of combination of A, B and C is less than the total number of bytes involved, due to the leaked key bytes between A and B. By the key schedule of AES-256, knowledge of columns 1, 2, 3, 4 of the subkey K (8) (belongs to key path A) allows to deduce columns 2, 3, 4 of the subkey K (6) , columns 3, 4 of the subkey K (4) , column 4 of K (2) . So K By above observation we can reduce the memory complexity by a factor of 2 24 with a similar method mentioned in [6] . We rearrange the key bytes in the key search phase. Choose a set of 2 32 plaintexts with bytes on the diagonal taking all possible values and the other 12 bytes fixed. Obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. The attack is Algorithm 5.2. The memory complexity of this attack is 2 176 × 256 = 2 184 bytes, while the original attack is at least 2 208 bytes. With a time-memory tradeoff, the original attack can reduce the memory complexity at the cost of increasing the time complexity. Our attack obtains a lower memory complexity without changing the time complexity-2 208 encryptions. This is not the best result for 8-round AES-256, but can remind us of examining the key schedule more carefully.
Safer++
The author in [25] proposed integral cryptanalysis on 4-round Safer++ 256 [33] . We find that a slight modification for this attack can bring another one round extension. K 2r−1 and K 2r are subkeys in round r. K (p) i denotes the p'th byte of K i . A forward key dependency path is as follows:
. Although the combination of these two paths relates to 30 bytes subkeys, its AKI is only 22 bytes. This makes the 5-round attack successful: 2-round integral property and 3 rounds external extension. Unlike the original attack, we only check whether one byte is balanced and this is enough to be a non-trivial attack.
Our Criterion and Further Discussion
Considering above attacks, we propose a criterion for the design of key schedule: A key schedule should have no r-round key dependency path with AKI less than the size of master key. r is dependent on specific security standards for different block ciphers. For a high security level, r should be as small as possible. We discuss the unsafe consequences when our criterion is not satisfied:
-If a backward/forward calculation dependency path of length r with insufficient AKI exists, then there is a r-round extension for an attack with a proper data complexity. e.g. the attacks in [24] and in Section 4.3. -If a backward calculation dependency path of length r 1 and a forward calculation dependency path of length r 2 with insufficient AKI and certain kind of connection exist, then there is a meet-in-the-middle attack. e.g. the attacks in Section 5.1, 5.2. Memory complexity of this attack can be further reduced when there is leakage in their key dependency paths. e.g. the attack in Section 5.3. The simplest connection is that the outputs of these two paths are the same one, which results in a basic meet-in-the-middle attack. If the connection is of r 3 length, there is a (r 1 +r 2 +r 3 )-round attack.
-If the total AKI of the combination of paths at the top and bottom is insufficient, a basic splice-and-cut technique is feasible. e.g. the attack in [6] . -If there are calculation dependency paths with insufficient AKI in successive sub-functions, a construction for initial structure is feasible. e.g. the attack in Section 4.2. -When a calculation dependency path has been used in an attack, the existence of missing key bits in segments of this path will further reduce the time complexity. That is, we generalize "The distributive technique" mentioned in [6] to other attack scenarios-the original technique is just as an optimization for exhaustive search. We divide a path into consecutive segments and for some segments the search computation for the missing key bits is saved. For example, we can reduce the time complexity of 6-round attack on MISTY1 in [8] at least by a factor of 2. We separate K 4 and K 6 from the key guessing process, since they are only used in AKI 3,2 , KL 4,1 and KL 4,2 .
That is, when we compute D (33..48) from the plaintexts, we needn't to guess
The attacks for XTEA in [9] and Section 5.2 can also be slightly improved by this technique. The longer the segment is and the less AKI the segment has, the more time complexity can be reduced. Although improvement brought by this technique is very minor, it still implies a potential defect for key schedules. Even it is uncertain whether there will be any kinds of disastrous attacks based on this defect, obviously many existing attacks are easier than what they were considered before.
There are three major causes for existing key schedules without satisfying our criterion. In order to explain more clearly, we give 3-round examples which are simple but typical.
-The subkey bits are poorly used and distributed by the round function, especially when the subkey size is much smaller than the block size and master key size. For the 3-round path in the left of Fig. 3 , it is obvious that only part of sk 1 is involved, while sk 2 and sk 3 are not used and distributed. -The subkeys do not increase the avalanche effect of the master key(e.g. simple permutation), so key dependency paths probably contain a small amount of key information. See the right of Fig. 3 , in this situation the first cause is eliminated and each intermediate value is keyed. Suppose that the master key is (
Although there are 9 sub-blocks of subkeys in this path, their AKI is only 5 sub-blocks. -The key information leakage decreases the AKI. In our context, the leakage means key bits that can be easily derived from the AKI in a key dependency path. Leakage usually occurs when the patterns of diffusion in the cipher round function and in the key schedule are overlapping. Also see the right of Fig. 3 , in this situation the subkeys are not simple permutation from the master key and have some avalanche effect. Suppose that sk 2,1 = sk 1,1 ⊕ sk 1,2 ⊕ sk 1,3 , sk 2,2 = sk 1,2 ⊕ sk 1,4 ⊕ sk 1,5 , sk 3,1 = sk 1,5 ⊕ sk 2,1 ⊕ sk 2,3 , the AKI is 6 sub-blocks. Fig. 3 . Examples corresponding to different causes. ski means the subkey in round i. ski,j means the j'th sub-block of ski which is involved in the calculation dependency path.
According to above causes, we suggest more detailed requirements for a key schedule. Every forward and backward key dependency path as well as their combinations should be carefully examined.
-The subkey size is no small than the block size and master key size, which makes sure every intermediate value in a path get keyed. -More and more key bits should be involved with each transformation in the key schedule. A simple permutation, e.g. shift or rotation, is not preferred. Binary linear operations such as XOR and modulo addition are better. -The diffusion path in the key schedule should be totally inconsistent with the diffusion in round function. That is, any subkey bits cannot be determined by the subkey bits that are in the same key dependency path.
Measure for Recursive Key Schedule
In this section we consider the requirements for linear transformation of recursive key schedules. A recursive key schedule means that the generation of current subkey is based on the value of previous subkeys. We believe that a recursive key schedule possesses more advantages in the design of block cipher: generating subkeys on-the-fly without precomputaion, which is especially requisite in hash mode application; increasing the avalanche effect of key bits round-by-round; security measure can be more normative and systematic. Recursive key schedules can help to control the speed and pattern of key bits diffusion by the iteration. We only need to investigate one round transformation and the results can extend to any rounds. If each subkey directly transforms from the master key without relations with its neighbour rounds, the measure is hard since we need to check key dependency paths from each round.
Consider the three causes we summarized in Section 6. The first cause is mainly due to the structure of block cipher and has nothing to do with key schedule's diffusion. Also, if the linear operations in recursive key schedules cannot involve more bits to increase the diffusion after each round (e.g, shift, rotation), we can analyze these simple key schedules directly and eliminate the second cause. Thus we only consider those recursive linear transformations with operations introducing more diffusion(e.g, XOR and modulo addition), and focus on avoiding the third cause: the diffusion of key schedule does not result in key information leakage in the diffusion path of round cipher. Note that this is only a necessary condition for a secure key schedule.
Usually linear transformations of both block cipher and key schedule can be represented as follows: LT → y j = a i,j x i + b j , where y j and x i are the output and input respectively, and b j ∈ GF(2) is the constant coefficient. All a i,j over GF(2) constitute the representing matrix, and a i,j = 1 means output j is dependent on input i. So we can know the input bits that each output bit depends on from each column of the matrix. M 1 represents the matrix of the round function, and M 2 represents the matrix of the key schedule. We discuss the conditions M 2 should satisfy when M 1 is known.
Step.3 For each j, j ∈ [1..k], if weight(θ j α j + β) > weight(β), increase AKI by 1 bit, else make θ j equal to 0. Check if AKI = k. If AKI = k, go Step.4, otherwise, M 2 is unsafe.
Step.4 For any subset s with elements chosen from θ 1 , θ 2 ,...,θ k , if weight( θj ∈s θ j α j +β)-2 weight(β) < weigth(s), AKI = AKI -weight(s) + 3 weight( θj ∈s θ j α j +β) -weight(β). If AKI < k, M 2 is unsafe.
By inverse of LT we can examine the other direction of key dependency paths. We show an example to explain above procedure in Fig. 4 . Assume M 1 is 4 × 4 and M 2 is 8 × 8, i.e. k = 8, and n = 4. They are as follows: When i = 1, θ = (1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0), β = (1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1) , AKI = 7. For j = 1, θ 1 α 1 = (1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1), θ 1 α 1 + β = β. For other j, we can check that θ j α j + β = β. So there is no j satisfying that weight(θ j α j + β) > weight(β), AKI still equals to 7 bits. This shows that M 2 is unsafe and we need not go Step.4.
Conclusion
This paper focuses on the diffusion of key schedules and proposes a criterion by the definition of AKI: every key dependency path corresponding to the calculation dependency path should have enough AKI-the actual required key information. We have shown several published attacks to explain our criterion, and presented new cryptanalysis results on SHACAL-2, XTEA, Serpent, AES and Safer++. We believe that this criterion can be used to improve attacks for other block ciphers by analyzing their key schedules. Many previous design rules of key schedules lack necessity or practicality, so it is hard to convince designers to follow. Our work gives a practical guidance for both the design and the cryptanalysis. Open problems include how to design efficient key schedules satisfying our criterion and how to develop new attacks based on weak key schedules with paths of insufficient AKI. Our work emphasizes that the interaction between the diffusion of cipher round function and the diffusion of key schedule should get more attention. An analysis for the linear transformation of recursive key schedules is given in our work, and more effective and generalized analysis tools can be further developed.
